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"CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE":
PROTECTING THE INNOCENT OWNER
OF REAL PROPERTY FROM CIVIL
FORFEITURE UNDER
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the first criminal forfeiture statutes
over two decades ago,1 asset forfeiture has become a potent and
effective means of combating two of the most extensive criminal
practices carried on in this country: drug trafficking and racketeering.2 Forfeiture involves the confiscation by the government, without compensation, of property illegally used or acquired. 3 By
targeting the spoils of illegal drug operations, forfeiture laws are a
logical deterrent to narcotics dealers and organizations whose activity is motivated and sustained by the prospect of tremendous
monetary rewards.4 Unfortunately, this powerful law enforcement
weapon does have one serious and undesirable repercussion; that
is, innocent owners whose property has been used by others in the
See The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
2 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3374 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
3 See United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1 (C.D.

Cal. 1978); U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG AGENT'S GUIDE TO THE
FORFEITURE OF ASSETS 2 (1987 rev.) [hereinafter GUIDE]. There are two types of forfeiture

proceedings: in rem and in personam.Id. at 5. In personam forfeiture is directed against an
individual to decide his personal rights and obligations. Id. Forfeiture in rem is directed
against the property itself to determine its ownership. Id.
4 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 191. Courts have recognized deterrence to drug
trade involvement as the purpose of forfeiture laws. See United States v. Gulfstream W.,
710 F. Supp. 792, 794 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (forfeiture intended to "remove the incentive to engage in the drug trade and to deny drug dealers the use of their ill-gotten'gains"); United
States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("purposes [of forfeiture] include removing the incentive to engage in the drug trade"); United States v.
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Va. 1986) ("purpose [of forfeiture] is to strip
racketeers and drug dealers of their 'economic bases' "), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Russell, Fightingthe New Crime Control Act,
7 CAL. LAW 18 (Oct. 1987). "The Drafters of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act were not
just interested in removing dangerous individuals from the streets; they also wanted to keep
crime from paying." Id.
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pursuit of the drug trade may find themselves unintended casualties of the war against drugs. Often such owners suffer hardship
and at times economic ruin as their homes, 8 businesses,7 and rental
property8 are forfeited to the government to terminate drug activity that they, as private individuals, were powerless to prevent.9
Among the numerous forfeiture provisions adopted by Congress in recent years ° is subsection 881(a)(7) of title 21 of the
United States Code,11 which provides for the civil forfeiture of real
property used to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony
under the federal narcotics laws. Recognizing the need for an adequate balance between the urgent demands of law enforcement au5 See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights:
The Need for Further Law Reform, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1254 passim (discussing need for law
reform to improve protection of innocent third parties); Strafer, Civil Forfeitures:Protecting the Innocent Owner, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 841 passim (1985) (proposing safeguards to
protect innocent owners from forfeiture); Comment, Shouldn't the Punishment Fit the
Crime?, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 417 passim (1989) (discussing failure of civil forfeiture law to
provide adequate protection to innocent owners).
6 See United States v. One Single Family Residence, 894 F.2d 1511, 1512 (11th Cir.
1990) (family residence); United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 233 (9th Cir. 1988)
(dwelling house and surrounding land), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 364 (1989); United States v.
19026 Oakmont S. Dr., 715 F. Supp. 233, 235 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (forfecture action against
"actual residence of [a] sixty-eight year old [woman]"). But see United States v. 4492 S.
Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1265 (2d Cir. 1989) (civil forfeiture case recognizing "an individual's substantial interest in the home ... is 'entitled to a unique sensitivity from federal
courts' ") (citing United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978)).
1 See United States v. 8848 S. Commercial St., (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) ("Casa Blanca" tavern); United States v. 710 Main St., 744 F.
Supp. 510, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (bar and video game arcade); United States v. 288-290 N.
St., 743 F. Supp. 1068, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (grocery and deli business); United States v.
Sixteen Clinton St., 730 F. Supp. 1265, 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (fabric store and grocery
store).
8 See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 873 (2d Cir. 1990) (six-story apartment building), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. 303 W. 116th St., 901
F.2d 288, 289 (2d Cir. 1990) (company-owned building with street-level storefront and residential apartments).
9 See 710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. at 524-25 (discussing claimant's inability to terminate
illegal activity because of personal strength and limitations); United States v. 171-02 Liberty
Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (property should not be forfeited because of
claimant's refusal to take heroic personal risks and his inability to accomplish result even
police could not accomplish).
1o Although this Note examines civil real property forfeiture, forfeitures may also be
criminal in nature. For a comparison of civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) to
criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988), see Smith, The Scope of Real Property
Forfeiturefor Drug-Related Crimes Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 303, 323-29 (1988).
11 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988); see infra note 40 (text of § 881(a)(7)).
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thorities and the legitimate interests of innocent owners,12 Congress included an affirmative defense within this provision
commonly known as the "innocent owner" defense. This defense
protects an owner from the harsh effects of forfeiture by allowing
him to exempt himself from the forfeiture laws if he is able to establish that the unlawful activity took place without his "knowledge or consent." 13 Although founded on good intentions, this provision has proved to be an imperfect solution to the plight of the
innocent owner since federal courts thus far have been unable to
develop a consistent interpretation of the phrase "knowledge or
consent." 4
This Note will examine the issues associated with civil forfeiture statutes and their impact on innocent property owners. Part
One will present a brief history of the law of forfeiture and a
description of the current statutory scheme governing civil forfeiture under section 881 of title 21 of the United States Code. Part
Two will focus on the "innocent owner" defense to real property
forfeiture. It will begin by examining conflicting judicial decisions
in the area and then proceed to discuss the two major issues causing this conflict and identify the reasons why courts have been unable to resolve them. Finally, Part Three will propose a three-step
analysis for the application of the "innocent owner" defense
designed to promote uniformity and predictability in the area.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND OF FORFEITURE LAW

History

It is a common phenomenon in law, and indeed in all of history, that the traditions, beliefs, and necessities of a previous age
give rise to certain rules or doctrines.15 Throughout the course of
many centuries the reasons giving rise to these rules often disap2

Each time Congress has broadened the range of property forfeitable under section

881 to improve its potency as a law enforcement weapon, it correspondingly has added new
safeguards to protect innocent owners who are affected by this expansion. See Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in
Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. Rav. 165, 167-71 (1990) (examining legislative history of expansion of
"innocent owner" protection).
13 Cf. 124 CONG. REc. 23,056 (daily ed. July 27, 1978) (statement of Sen. Culver) (stating reason for including defense within civil forfeiture provision).
" See infra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
15See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).
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pear and may be forgotten, yet the principles remain. 16 This is true
of the law of forfeiture, 17 a practice rooted in the days of the Bible"8 and recorded in the ancient manuscripts of Greece 9 and
Rome. 20 The forfeiture of property associated with criminal activity is a long-accepted practice in the United States as well as in
England.2 Still, despite its early roots, the role of forfeiture in this
See id.
1 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.19 (1974) ("adaptation of the [early doctrine of forfeiture] to serve the more contemporary function of
deterrence is an example of [the] phenomenon discussed by Mr. Justice Holmes"); O.W.
HOLMES, supra note 15, at 5-12 (discussing ancient forms of forfeiture as illustration of this
observation).
One commentator has criticized the modern-day use of forfeiture stating that "[c]urrent
federal... civil forfeiture statutes that treat property itself as a wrongdoer are extensions of
archaic concepts." Comment, Civil Forfeiture and Innocent Third Parties, 3 N. ILL. U.L.
REV. 323, 325 (1983).

'a See O.W,HOLMES, supra note 15. "If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die:
then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten ...." Id. at 7 (citing
Exodus 21:28). This well known Old Testament passage was cited by Justice Holmes as a
precursor to the modern law of forfeiture. Id. at 6. This Biblical rule, which, in effect, commanded that the ox be forfeited to God, operated irrespective of the guilt or innocence of
the animal's owner. See GUIDE, supra note 3. Still, the misfortunate owner lost all claim to
it. Id. But see Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some HistoricalPerspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 18081 (1973) ("offending animal is not 'offered to God' ... [and] [t]he stoned ox ... can no
more be regarded as a . .. 'forfeiture' than an executed traitor").
" See O.W. HOLMSS,supra note 15. Ancient Greek law contained many elaborate provisions governing the forfeiture of objects that were associated with certain wrongs. Id. at 78. If a beast or an inanimate object caused death it was to be cast beyond the borders. Id. at
8.Two centuries after Christ, the traveler Pausanias observed that "they still sat in judgment on inanimate things in the Prytaneum." Id.
20 See 7 Twelve Tables 1, translatedin 1 S. Scorr, THE CIVIL LAW 69 (1932). Examples
of forfeiture in Roman law can be found as far back as 451 B.C.. Id. "[I]f a quadruped
causes injury to anyone, let the owner... surrender the animal that caused the injury." Id.
Although such actions were not based on fault, whoever owned the animal at the time the
suit was brought became liable. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 9.
21 See O.W.HOLMES, supra note 15, at 24-25 (tracing history of forfeiture in early English common law); see also Finkelstein, supra note 18, at 180-83. In the early stages of
English common law, if a chattel accidentally caused the death of one of the King's subjects,
it was forfeited to the Crown and its value was used to pay for Masses said on behalf of the
deceased. Id. at 182. This charitable religious purpose was soon discarded however and the
practice became nothing more than a convenient source of revenue for the state. Id. Although formally abolished in 1846, this practice still remains the classic example of in rem
forfeiture, which is based on the notion that an animal or an inanimate object can itself
become tainted with guilt when connected with certain wrongful or criminal acts. See
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). In personam statutory and common-law forfeiture, whereby the property of those convicted of felonies or treason was confiscated, also existed under early English law. Id. at 682. In addition, the Navigation Acts provided for the statutory forfeiture in rem of certain items used in connection
with a violation of the customs and revenue laws. Id. at 683. The owner's guilt or innocence
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22
country's criminal justice system has been insignificant at best.
That is, until 1970, when Congress resurrected the doctrine by
passing the first series of criminal forfeiture statutes in the history
of American jurisprudence.2 3

B.

The Statutory Scheme

The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 197024 was passed in response to the "growing menace of drug
abuse in the United States. '2 5 In formulating this legislation, Congress recognized that routine criminal sanctions such as fines and
imprisonment were an inadequate deterrent to participants in the
drug trade.26 This was attributed to the fact that, unlike many
was irrelevant to these proceedings and, in making its determination, the court would look
solely to the wrongful use of the property itself. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 261-62 (1774).
By contrast, the practice of forfeiting chattel was not a feature of early American common law. See Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 682. Nor have American courts or legislatures ever
decreed that the property of certain classes of criminals should be forfeited to the government. Id. However, the common-law courts of the colonies exercised jurisdiction in rem over
vessels and commodities under both the English and American forfeiture laws. Id. at 683. It
is interesting to note that such forfeiture proceedings continued to take place even after the
adoption of the United States Constitution. Id.
22 See GUIDE, supra note 3, at 1. This is at least one reason why few schools offer
courses on forfeiture, few legal experts specialize in it, and only a few citizens are even
aware of the concept. Id.
Several sources exist containing practical advice to attorneys who are unfamiliar with
forfeiture litigation. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 4, at 20 (discussing difficulties of defending forfeiture cases under Comprehensive Crime Control Act but concluding "the defense
attorney who reads the statutes carefully with an eye toward limiting their impact can even
the odds somewhat in individual cases"); Valukas & Walsh, Forfeitures:When Uncle Sam
Says You Can't Take It With You, 14 LITIGATION 31, 37 (1988) (listing ten suggestions for
attorneys defending civil forfeiture cases).
23 See GUIDE, supra note 3, at 1 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. §
848 (1988)).
24 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988)).
22 H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4566, 4567.
21 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2 (discussing purpose underlying Comprehensive
Crime Control Act and 1984 amendments). Senate Report 225 states:

Today, few in the Congress or the law enforcement community fail to recognize that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs
which, with its inevitable attendant violence, is plaguing the country. Clearly if
law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an attack may be made.
Id.; see also 130 CONG. REC. S13078 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
("overwhelming bipartisan support for this legislation marks the culmination of more than a
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other crimes, profit is the main motivation for the exchange of
dangerous and expensive drugs and for the rampant violence that
inevitably flows from the trade.2 7 Thus, through this Act, Congress
sought to supplement the more traditional criminal penalties by
providing a law enforcement device that would not only punish,
but would also strip offenders of their economic gains.2 That device is the forfeiture of assets.2"
As originally enacted, section 881 authorized the forfeiture of
controlled substances, certain raw materials, containers, and vehicles used in connection with drug activity.30 Senator Robert Byrd
was among the first to express optimism about the use of forfeiture
in the war against drugs, stating that "[b]y removing its leaders
from positions of ownership ... and by visiting heavy economic
sanctions on their predatory business practices this legislation
should prove to be a mighty deterrent to any further expansion of
organized crime's economic power." 31 By 1978, however, it became
apparent that forfeiture was not working as effectively as expected.3 2 Thus, Congress decided to increase the efficacy of the forfeiture laws 3 by expanding the range of property subject to forfeidecade of effort in Congress to deal . . . with the manifest flaws in our archaic criminal
justice system"); 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (July 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Nunn) ("[in
today's narcotic traffic the profits to be made are astronomical. The penalties are not so
substantial; the deterrent is likewise minimal, mainly because of the present sentencing and
bail provisions").
27 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2.
28 See id.; see also 130 CONG. REc. S13088 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen.
D'Amato) ("goal of our legislation . . . is nothing less than stripping the drug kingpins of
their drug profit empires").
29 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2.
20 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1981). As originally enacted, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) provided for the
forfeiture of:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of [title 21].
(2) All raw materials, products and equipment ...
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances ... which are used, or are intended for use, to transport...
property described in paragraph (1) or (2).
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1276 (1970).
31 116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970).
2 Cf. 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (1978) (statement of Sen. Nunn) ("we were losing the
battle as well as the war [against drugs]").
22 See id. Senator Nunn emphasized that "[w]e cannot forget that profit, astronomical
profit, is the base motivation of drug traffickers. The amendment I propose here today is
intended to enhance the efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the United States by
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ture so as to include the proceeds of illegal drug transactions.3 4
Nonetheless, results fell far short of expectationss s
Determined to remedy the system's shortcomings, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 19848 in order to
stimulate the under-utilized forfeiture provisions by "eliminat[ing]
the statutory limitations and ambiguities that have frustrated ac''aT
tive pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement agencies.
One such limitation was that, under then existing civil forfeiture
law,3 8 real property could not be forfeited even when it was found
striking out against the profits from illicit drug trafficking." Id.
Senator John Culver anticipated that the forfeiture of the proceeds of drug transactions
would "disrupt drug trafficking by greatly raising the risk of such trafficking, reducing the
profits involved and immobilizing certain drug rings by seizing large amounts of their assets." Id. at 23056 (statement of Sen. Culver).
See The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 95633, § 301(1), 92 Stat. 3777 (1978) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1981)); see also
infra note 91 (text of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)).
35 See S. REP.No. 225, supra note 2. In April of 1981, a report by the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), entitled Asset Forfeiture-A Seldom Used Tool in Combatting Drug
Trafficking, announced that the government's record in deterring crime had fallen far below
what Congress initially expected. Id. The GAO identified the two major reasons for this
failure: (1) federal law enforcement agencies were not aggressive in the pursuit of forfeiture;
and (2) the many limitations and ambiguities contained in the forfeiture statutes in effect at
that time significantly hampered the ability of forfeiture to function as a forceful deterrent
to drug traffickers. Id. The use of the forfeiture laws has apparently increased since that
report was issued. See Valukas & Walsh, supra note 22, at 31.
11 Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-23, 98 Stat. 2040-57 (1984). The Forfeiture Act amended
section 881 in two distinct ways. Id. First, it added section 881(a)(7) which provided for the
forfeiture of real property used to facilitate drug activity, which until that time had not
been subject to forfeiture. Id. § 306, 98 Stat. 2050. Second, it codified the "relation-back
doctrine" so that under section 881, title to subsection (a) property vested in the government at the time of the felonious act giving rise to the forfeiture. Id.
The "relation-back" doctrine first appeared in United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1
(1890). There, the United States Supreme Court held that the property interests of illegal
distillers were forfeited at the time of the commission of the offense, thereby allowing the
government to avoid claims of subsequent sales, even as to bona fide purchasers. Id. at 1617. For a thorough examination of the "relation-back" doctrine, see generally Note, supra
note 12, passim.
11 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 192. Congress was determined to develop a comprehensive program to deal with the drug crisis. See 130 CONG. REC.S13065 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1984) (statement of Sen. Biden). "[F]orfeiture of drug trafficker's assets will be a crucial
element of the federal anti-drug strategy. This strategy will define how the various agencies
will contribute to improving the number and level of forfeiture cases." Id.
" Even before Congress enacted a specific provision which would subject real property
to civil forfeiture, real property was already subject to criminal forfeiture under the RICO
and CCE statutes. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 193-95; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1988) (under RICO, any interest in real or personal property acquired or maintained in
violation of statute is forfeitable). Also, at least two federal courts had held that real property could be subject to civil forfeiture if it constituted, or was traceable to, the "proceeds"
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to have been an important or even essential component of drugrelated activity.3 9 To close this loophole, Congress enacted subsection 881(a)(7) authorizing the forfeiture of all real property used in
connection with a felony narcotics violation.4 0
of an illegal drug transaction under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). See United States v. 8584
Old Brownsville Rd., 736 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Route 3, 568 F.
Supp. 434, 436 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
11 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 195. The Senate Report accompanying the 1984
amendment which added section 881(a)(7) stated:
Under current law, if a person uses a boat or car to transport narcotics or uses
equipment to manufacture dangerous drugs, his use of the property renders it
subject to civil forfeiture. But if he uses a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a manufacturing laboratory for amphetamines, there is
no provision to subject his real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was
indispensable to the commission of a major drug offense and the prospect of the
forfeiture of the property would have been a powerful deterrent.
Id.
Interestingly, this example of a limitation of the forfeiture law which existed prior to
section 881(a)(7) has generated confusion as to whether a "substantial connection" must be
demonstrated between the underlying narcotics violation and the subject property in order
to expose it to civil forfeiture. Some courts have concluded that the example is an indication
of congressional intent that a "substantial connection" is necessary. See United States v.
Santaro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1989) ("substantial connection" test is "common
sense" interpretation of § 881(a)(7)) (citing S. REP. No. 225); United States v. $12,585 in
United States Currency, 669 F. Supp. 939, 943 (D. Minn. 1987) ("example and language
used in the Senate report illustrate Congress' intent to subject real property to forfeiture
only if the property is substantially connected to illegal drug activity"); United States v.
Certain Lots in Va. Beach, 657 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("real property may be
subject to forfeiture under [§ 881(a)(7)] only where there is a substantial connection between the property and the underlying illegal transaction") (citing S. REP. No. 225).
Other courts do not agree that the Senate Report implies such an interpretation. For
example, in United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit expressed its understanding that "Itihe Senate Report cites some of the more
egregious examples created by the loophole in the forfeiture statute" and concluded that
"[t]he legislation itself. . . no more demands that the property be 'substantially connected'
to the underlying offense than it requires that the property be 'indispensable' to the
crime.'" Id.
Commentators have also expressed opposing views of the implications of this passage.
Compare Smith, supra note 10, at 328 (arguing that egregious examples in Senate Report
are "aimed at highlighting the [drug] problem by use of vivid examples" and do not indicate
need for substantial connection) with Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property
Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 471,
478 (1989) (rejecting argument that examples in passage are merely vivid illustrations of
drug problem and asserting that passage is indicative of Congressional intent).
40 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). Section 881(a)(7) provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
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II.

THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE

Subsection 881(a)(7) of title 21 of the United States Code affords an affirmative defense to innocent owners whose real property is subject to forfeiture because it has been misused by others,
if they are able to establish that the unlawful activity took place
"without ...

' Unfortunately, this
[their] knowledge or consent."41

language has generated much confusion, and disturbing inconsistencies have emerged in two major areas. First, courts have had
difficulty in determining the true import of the phrase "without..
. knowledge or consent. '42 Second, courts have been unable to
agree upon the relevance and applicability of the constitutional defense suggested by the United States43 Supreme Court in CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.

A. The "Knowledge or Consent" Issue
The innocent owner defense derives from subsection 881(a)(7),
which states that "no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."" The
difficulty arises because many courts, following a "conjunctive" interpretation,45 have determined that the word "or," used in this
context, should be read to mean "and," and therefore require the
property owner to establish both a lack of knowledge and a lack of
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punisha-

Id.

ble by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of
any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
41 See

id. Subsection 881(a)(7) was not the first provision of section 881 to contain a

defense for innocent owners. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1970) (as enacted provided defense

for owners whose vehicles were stolen and subsequently used in drug transactions); 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1981) (providing defense for innocent owners with language identical to
that of § 881(a)(7)); see also In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 1987)

(discussing legislative history of expansion of innocent party protection).
42 See infra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
43 416 U.S. 663 (1974); see infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
" 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
4' See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 302 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary

defines the

word "conjunctive" as that which "[c]onnect[s] in a manner denoting union. A grammatical

term for particles which serve for joining or connecting together. Thus, the word 'and' is
called a 'conjunctive,' and 'or' a 'disjunctive,' conjunction." Id.
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consent in order to qualify for the defense. 46 Other courts, following a "disjunctive" interpretation, 47 read the word "or" to mean
"or" and permit the owner to prove either that he was without
knowledge or without consent.48 Proponents of the "conjunctive"
approach argue that the "disjunctive" construction is potentially
too broad, while those in the "disjunctive" camp decry the "con49
junctive" interpretation as too narrow.
1.

Inconsistency in Judicial Interpretation

United States v. Real Property and Premises Known as 17102 Liberty Avenue5 0 was the first case in the nation to allow a
property owner to base his subsection 881(a)(7) "innocent owner"
defense entirely on a lack of consent, even though his knowledge of
the illegal activity had been conceded. 1 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York based its decision
4" See, e.g., United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) ("if the

claimant either knew or consented to the illegal activities, the 'innocent owner' defense is
unavailable") (emphasis in original); United States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 427
(S.D. Fla. 1989) ("claimant can succeed on the 'innocent owner' defense under § 881(a)(7)
by merely proving that he lacked knowledge of the illegal activity and that he did not consent to the activity") (emphasis added); United States v. 124 East N. Ave., 651 F. Supp.
1350, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (when tried, claimant "will have an opportunity to prove she had
no knowledge of and gave no consent to her husband's alleged unlawful activities") (emphasis added).
'"

See

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

supra note 45, at 469. A "disjunctive term" is defined

by Black's Law Dictionary as "[o]ne which is placed between two contraries, by the affirming of one of which the other is taken away; it is usually expressed by the word 'or.'" Id.
48 See, e.g., United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) ("claimant
may avoid forfeiture by establishing either that he had no knowledge of the narcotics activity or, if he had knowledge, that he did not consent to it"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017
(1991); United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel, 898 F.2d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 1990) ("party in
interest could successfully assert an innocent owner defense by proving either lack of knowledge or lack of consent") (emphasis added); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618,
626 (3d Cir. 1989) (claimant may demonstrate innocent ownership "by proving... that the
illegal use of [her] property occurred either without her knowledge or without her consent")
(emphasis added); United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
("statute... creat[es] an affirmative defense where the illegal acts giving rise to the forfeiture occurred without the knowledge or without the consent of the owner") (emphasis in
original).
'9 Compare United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 739 F. Supp. 111, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(contending that disjunctive approach would lead to "absurd results" because it allows "an
owner to know about, and perhaps even tacitly condone illegal drug activity, and yet still be
able to claim that she did not 'know or consent' to the activity") (citation omitted) with
141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 (asserting that conjunctive approach "ignores Congress'
desire to preserve the property of innocent owners").
80 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
" See id. at 50.
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solely on the text of the statute read in light of the "normal canons
of statutory construction. ' 52 Reasoning that, unlike the conjunctive
"and," the word "or" requires that terms separated by it be read
disjunctively, the court concluded that Congress intended such a
construction when it deliberately used the word "or" in the
53
provision.
Although a number of courts in other circuits were quick to
endorse this construction, 54 some district courts in the Second Circuit were skeptical as to its validity and precedential value55 and
instead adhered to the conjunctive approach. This led to disagreement and contradictory results within the Second Circuit until, in United States v. 141st Street Corp.,57 the United States
82 Id. The "normal canons of statutory construction" require that terms separated by
the disjunctive word "or" be given their separate meaning unless the context dictates otherwise. Id. (citations omitted). For a survey of contradictory results reached by courts employing these "canons," see infra note 85.
53 See Liberty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. at 50.
" See United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1418-19 (N.D. Ala.),
vacated on other grounds, 736 F. Supp. 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1990); United States v. 19026
Oakmont S. Dr., 715 F. Supp. 233, 237 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
85 See, e.g., United States v. 418 57th St., 737 F. Supp. 749, 750-51 (E.D.N.Y.) (criticizing Liberty Avenue court for construing provision in manner inconsistent with express language of statute), rev'd, 922 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 739 F.
Supp. 111, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to follow Liberty Avenue on grounds that issue of
statutory construction involved "substantial split of authority and has yet to be decided by
the Second Circuit"). But see United States v. 710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (agreeing with Liberty Avenue interpretation and granting relief to claimant who
knew of illegal activity but did not consent to it).
11See, e.g., Noyac Road, 739 F. Supp. at 115-16. Refusing to follow the purely textual
analysis of Liberty Avenue, the Noyac Road court instead adopted a common sense approach, stating that the issue is really "whether the phrase ought to be read as a disjunctive
or as a compound phrase." Id. at 113 (emphasis in original). Looking to the "context of
section 881," the court concluded that a disjunctive approach, giving the owner the option of
proving either lack of knowledge or lack of consent, would "lead to absurd results." Id. at
114. The court then pointed to the legislative history of the "innocent owner" language as
an indication of legislative intent. Id. Based on remarks made in 1978 by Senators Nunn
and Culver in reference to the innocent owner provision in section 881(a)(6), the court concluded that these legislators "[c]learly" did not intend for the alefense to protect owners who
had knowledge but did not consent to the illegal activity. Id. Thus, the court in Noyac Road
advocated a conjunctive approach requiring that the innocent owner establish a lack of both
elements in order to be eligible for the defense. Id. at 115-16.
57 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991). 141st Street Corp.
involved the forfeiture of a six-story building on the west side of Manhattan. Id. at 873.
Police testimony at the trial established that, over the course of eighteen months beginning
in December of 1986, 24 of the building's 41 apartments had been the subject of drug-trafficking complaints. Id. Other evidence indicated that the building was in fact a thriving
center for illegal drug activities. Id. After two successive police raids on the premises, the
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed this issue. 8 Although it did not analyze the text of the provision in the same
manner as the district court had in Liberty Avenue, 59 the Second
Circuit based its interpretation primarily on the language of the
statute itself, which it admitted to be ambiguous.6 0 Deciding that
the disjunctive approach was correct, the Second Circuit stated:
"We conclude that a claimant may avoid forfeiture by establishing
either that he had no knowledge of the narcotics activity or, if he
had knowledge, that he did not consent to it." 6 1
United States v. Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road,62 a
case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, illustrates how even judges on the same appellate court
can be divided. In Grubb Road, the court rejected the governgovernment sought forfeiture of the building pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). Id. Shortly
thereafter, the owner, Realty Corporation, filed a claim to the property, asserting its innocent ownership under the statute. Id. at 874.
58 Id. at 877.
59 See Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 50. In Liberty Avenue, the disrict court examined
the text of section 881(a)(7) in light of the "normal canons of statutory construction." One
of these interpretive rules is that the court must give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used in the statute. Id. (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39
(1955)). Relying on this principle, the Liberty Avenue court concluded that it must give
effect to Congress' use of the word "or" by interpreting the phrase "without knowledge or
consent" disjunctively. Id.
The Second Circuit took a different approach although it too examined the text of the
provision. See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878. Instead of concentrating on the disjunctive
word "or" as the Liberty Avenue court had, the Second Circuit focused on the term "consent" and reasoned that:
[I]n order to consent to drug activity, one must know of it. If we were to construe
section 881(a)(7) to mean that a claimant's knowledge alone precludes the innocent owner defense (i.e. that a claimant must disprove both knowledge and consent), then "consent" as used in the statute would be totally unnecessary. In other
words, the factfinder would never reach the issue of consent once it concluded that
the claimant had knowledge.
Id; see also Note, supra note 39, at 485-86 (proposing that disjunctive interpretation of
word "or" adopted in Menasche and applied in Liberty Avenue should instead be applied to
word "consent" and advocating a disjunctive construction which would "allow each term
independent significance").
11 See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 ("plain language of section 881(a)(7) is, at best,
confusing").
61 Id. (emphasis added). Although the Second Circuit adopted the disjunctive approach, it then required the claimant to "prove that he did all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the illegal activity once he learned of it," in order to establish lack of
consent. Id. at 879. The claimant was unable to meet this standard and the court affirmed
the judgment of the district court forfeiting the building. Id. at 882. For a discussion of the
application of this standard to cases arising under section 881(a)(7), see infra notes 117-33
and accompanying text.
62 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989).
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ment's contention that the phrase "without... knowledge or consent" should be read conjunctivelyv.6 Instead, the court adopted a
disjunctive approach and held that a wife's knowledge that her
husband had engaged in drug trafficking on the family property,
which the couple held as tenants by the entirety, did not necessarily preclude her from asserting the "innocent owner" defense."
Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court
with instructions that the claimant be given an opportunity first to
establish her "no knowledge defense,"6 5 and then, if that was unsuccessful, to consider whether she had established her "no consent defense. ' 66 The government's motion for a rehearing on this
67
issue was denied over the vigorous dissent of Judge Greenberg,
who viewed the matter as one of "enormous importance"68 and expressed his conviction that "the panel's opinion is directly contrary
to the language of [subsection] 881(a)(7), frustrates its purpose,
flies in the face of the very legislative history upon which the panel
relied, and is completely inconsistent with the in rem nature of a
civil property forfeiture." 9
Although Judge Greenberg did not believe it was necessary to
go beyond what he believed to be the "plain meaning" 70 of the
63 See id. at 626. "The government argue[d] that if the owner fail[ed] to show lack of
knowledge by a preponderance of the evidence, that in itself is sufficient to subject the
property to forfeiture." Id. at 623.
See id. at 626.
65 Id. at 627.
66 Id. "At the new hearing, [claimant's] burden [would] be to prove at least one negative under the statutory scheme." Id. at 626.
For an interesting discussion regarding the proof of negative propositions, see Saunders,
The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 S-roN HALL 276 (1985), arguing that, contrary to popular belief, "[t]here is no special difficulty in proving a negative." Id. at 277.
17 See 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 660 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
65 Id. (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 663 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). The thrust of Judge Greenberg's argument was
that the provision, by its terms, is susceptible of only one meaning and that the court's
analysis should properly have been limited to the plain meaning of the statute. Id. at 661
(Greenberg, J., dissenting). He agreed that since the terms in the phrase "without . . .
knowledge or consent" are separated by the word "or," they are disjunctive. Id. (Greenberg,
J., dissenting). However, in his view, this did not mean they were to be understood as establishing two independent defenses. Id. at 662 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). On the contrary,
Judge Greenberg believed that because the phrase is disjunctive, each of the terms relate
back to the offense so that the claimant would have to disprove both elements in order to
prevail. Id. at 661 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). Simply stated, under Judge Greenberg's proposed construction, if an owner failed to establish that the illegal activity took place both
without his knowledge and without his consent, he would lose. Id. (Greenberg, J.,
dissenting).
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statute and examine the legislative history of subsection 881(a)(7),
he did so anyway to repudiate the majority opinion by demonstrating that the legislative materials that the majority relied upon in
fact supported the government's position.71 Arguing that "it is
highly implausible that Congress, in enacting provisions clearly intended to strengthen the forfeiture weapon, [would leave] a massive loophole in them," 72 Judge Greenberg predicted that the
court's approach would curtail the government's ability to prosecute forfeiture cases and would foster collusion between spouses by
allowing drug dealers to place property in the names of their
spouses to thwart potential forfeiture actions. 3
Unlike the Second and Third Circuits, 4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently adopted the conjunctive interpretation. In United States v. Land Known as Lot
111-B, 5 the Ninth Circuit rejected the claimant's contention that
although he was aware of the unlawful activity which had taken
place on his property, he was nonetheless entitled to the benefit of
6
the innocent owner defense because he had not consented to it7

The Ninth Circuit based its decision entirely on one sentence from
a congressional joint committee report issued in 1978 which stated
that "the property would not be subject to forfeiture unless the
owner of such property knew or consented to the [illegal conduct]." ' 77 The court determined that this statement "leaves no
See id. at 663 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
See id. (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 664-65 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). This fear of spousal collusion was put to
rest by the Third Circuit in United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel, 898 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.
1990), where the court, in affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of the government, rejected a claim by a drug dealer's wife that she knew of, but had not consented to,
her husband's activity. Id. at 398-99. The 107.9 Acre court concluded that to allow the case
to go to trial based solely on her uncorroborated testimony would "make a mockery of the
forfeiture provision of this statute in a marital context." Id. at 400. The Sixth Circuit also
downplayed the possibility of such collusion in United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d
343 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1414 (1991), wherein the court stated that "such
evasive actions would be undermined by the heavy burden placed upon claimants to prove
their innocent ownership status." Id. at 348. The Leroy Lane court also noted that any late
conveyance by a drug dealer to his spouse "would be thwarted by the relation-back provision, under which the Government's interest in the property relates back to the time of the
commission of the crime." Id. at 349. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(h)).
" Thus far, only the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits have decided this precise issue.
See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text; infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
75 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990).
71 See id. at 1445 (since claimant "knew of the illegal activities, his assertion
of lack of
consent was of no consequence").
"'See id. The court cited the JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF TITLES II AND III, 95th
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doubt as to the proper interpretation of the 'knew or consented'
language'78 and concluded that "if the claimant either knew or
consented to the illegal activities, the 'innocent owner' defense is
7' 9
unavailable.
2.

Source of the Controversy

Four general observations may be made regarding the reasoning employed in these cases and the recurring arguments asserted
on both sides of the issue that account for the inconsistent judicial
interpretations of subsection 881(a)(7)'s innocent owner defense.
a. Literal analysis
Although the provision is ambiguous, s° many courts have determined that a literal analysis, based entirely on the language of
the statute itself, provides an adequate indication of the meaning
of the defense and how it should be applied."' This approach has
fostered widespread disparity since the terms of the provision
readily admit to more than one meaning.8 2 As a result, inconsistent
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9518, 9522-23. Lot 111B, 902 F.2d at 1445. This report was issued six years prior to the addition of section
881(a)(7). Id. Moreover, the statement quoted from the report was made in reference to
section 881(a)(6). Id.
78 Id.
70 Id. (emphasis in original).
80 See generally Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV.
509 passim (1940) (discussing difficulties in determining whether statute is ambiguous).
Not all judges would agree that the statutory language of section 881(a)(7) is ambiguous. See, e.g., Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 661 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (if language of statute
is unambiguous, "it is presumed to express the legislative purpose and resort to the legislative history is not necessary") (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68
(1982)); United States v. 418 57th St., 737 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E.D.N.Y.) (clear statement in
statute may only be interpreted one way), rev'd, 922 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1990).
In interpreting statutes, courts retain a good deal of discretion as to whether the lan-

guage is clear or ambiguous. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr,

CRIMINAL LAW 75 (1986).
8' See, e.g., 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 (applying "ordinary meaning of the word

'consent'" to interpret § 881(a)(7)); Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 50 ("statutory language is
all the court has to go on. Fortunately it is enough"); Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 661 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (urging that language of § 881(a)(7) is unambiguous and "susceptible of
only one interpretation").
82 See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878. In 141st Street Corp., the Second Circuit recognized that there are two plausible meanings of the "without ... knowledge or consent"
phrase in section 881(a)(7):
Congress' use of the disjunctive "or" suggests that a claimant should succeed by
establishing either lack of knowledge or lack of consent. On the other hand, inclusion of the word "without" before the phrase "knowledge or consent" might be
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decisions have been rendered by courts that find different "plain
meanings" in the phrase "without... knowledge or consent.

'83

Be-

cause the language is, as one court acknowledged, "at best, confusing," 4 this literal approach is an insufficient means of discovering
the true import of the defense.8 " Even more disturbing is the fact
that this method of interpretation has shifted the focus from issues
of policy and substance to the rigid analysis of grammar, syntax
and formal logic."6 Consequently, courts may decide cases without
interpreted to mean that an innocent owner must be without both knowledge and
consent.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
11 One commentator eloquently discussed the defects of such an approach. See Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation:An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 344 (1976).
How is one to foretell rationally whether a given provision will strike a court
as "plain"? Decisions arrived at by "plain meaning" may in fact confound expectations. There are even instances where judges have found different "plain meanings" in the same statutory language. Indeed, it has been suggested that the characterization of "plain" or "ambiguous" is used by courts as a device to achieve a

result arrived at on some other basis, i.e., as a screen for the imposition of judicial
views.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878.
8' A particularly good example of the unpredictability and disagreement that is fostered by the literal approach is in the use of the so-called "normal canons of statutory construction" to determine the proper interpretation of the defense. In Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1979), the Supreme Court set forth the principle that terms
separated by the disjunctive word "or" must be given their separate meaning unless the
context dictates otherwise. Id. Some courts applying this rule to the innocent owner provision of section 881(a)(7) have concluded that the statutory language requires a disjunctive
interpretation. See, e.g., Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626 ("canons" dictate disjunctive approach);
United States v. Sixty (60) Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1419 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (same), vacated
on other grounds, 736 F. Supp. 1579 (1990); Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 50 (use of the
word "or" requires terms "knowledge" and "consent" to be read disjunctively). Yet, other
courts citing the same rule have concluded that a conjunctive interpretation is appropriate.
See, e.g., Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 661 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (since terms in § 881(a)(7)
defense are separated by "or," claimant must disprove both "knowledge" and "consent" and
this approach is consistent with "canons"); United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 739 F. Supp.
111, 113-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("canons" call for conjunctive construction).
One commentator has pointed out that in Reiter, the terms discussed were not cast in
the negative as the phrase "without . . . knowledge or consent" is, and therefore the "canons" require a conjunctive interpretation of § 881(a)(7). See Note, supra note 39, at 482.
The use of "canons of statutory construction" as an indication of meaning has been
criticized. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 80 (questioning "whether courts first
decide how a defective statute ought to be interpreted and then display whatever canons of
statutory construction will make this interpretation look inevitable, or whether the courts
actually first use the applicable canons and second reach the result").
8 See supra note 85; see also Note, supra note 39, at 480-81 (logical principle known as
De Morgan's theorem requires conjunctive interpretation of phrase "without... knowledge
or consent").
14
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engaging in the thoughtful reasoning that would ensure predictability and fairness, and provide a sound foundation upon which to
base future decisions.87
b.

Legislative history and commentary concerning
subsection 881(a)(6)

In order to compensate for the scarcity of legislative materials
available to explain subsection 881(a)(7),88 many courts have resorted to statements and commentary made with regard to subsection 881(a)(6) for guidance in the application of the innocent
owner defense.8 9 In so doing, these courts assume that since the
innocent owner defense language of both provisions is identical,
statements made in reference to subsection 881(a)(6) are necessarily applicable to subsection 881(a)(7).9 ° However, a closer exami87 See Kernochan, supra note 83 ("Itlhe discussion that characterizes plain meaning
cases has been labeled as 'sterile verbalism' ") (citing H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1265 (temp. ed. 1958)).

88See, e.g., Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 624 (noting "sparse" legislative history of

§ 881(a)(7)). The addition of a real property provision to section 881 was only a small part
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Id. Much of the legislative history included in the Senate Report accompanying section 881(a)(7) is a discussion of the changes
in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") and Continuing Criminal
Enterprise ("CCE") statutes. Id. (citing 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 33743404).
Only two substantive passages in this Senate Report refer to the newly-enacted real
property forfeiture provision but neither of them provides guidance on the proper application of the phrase "without ...knowledge or consent." The first identifies one of the limitations in the previous law that the new amendment was designed to eliminate. See S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 2, at 195; see also supra note 39 (full text of this passage). The second
passage describes the structure of the provision itself:
The first amendment would add to the list of property subject to civil forfeiture set out in section 881(a) real property which is used or intended to be used in
a felony violation of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. This provision
would also include an "innocent owner" exception like that now included in those
provisions permitting the civil forfeiture of certain vehicles and moneys or
securities.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 215.
I'Compare United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (relying on
legislative history of § 881(a)(6) and adopting conjunctive approach) with Grubb Rd., 886
F.2d at 625 (legislative history of § 881(a)(6) warrants disjunctive approach).
10 See, e.g., Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625 (attention should be given to legislative history
of § 881(a)(6) in § 881(a)(7) case); United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 739 F. Supp. 111, 114
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (remarks of Senators regarding § 881(a)(6) apply to identical language of
§ 881(a)(7)); Monroe Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Catalano, 733 F. Supp. 595, 598 n.2 (W.D.N.Y.
1990) (legislative history of § 881(a)(6) clearly applies with equal force to § 881(a)(7)); see
also Note, supra note 39, at 484 n.85 (acknowledging relevance of § 881(a)(6) legislative
history in interpreting § 881(a)(7) innocent owner defence because of identical language in
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nation of the defenses as they operate under each of these distinct
provisions reveals that this assumption is erroneous.
Subsection 881(a)(6) pertains to the "proceeds" of illegal drug
transactions and provides for the forfeiture of all valuable assets
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance and all receipts,
both monetary and nonmonetary, that are traceable to such an exchange.91 Because the forfeitability of these assets hinges not upon
how they have been used, but rather upon how they were obtained, 92 the innocent owner protection provided in this provision
takes the form of a bona fide purchaser defense. 8 To qualify as a
"bona fide" purchaser, one must acquire property in good faith
94
without knowledge of the illicit activity from which it derived.
both, but asserting that it provides no clear basis for determining construction of "without
. . . knowledge or consent").
91 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:

Id.

(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this title, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and
all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this title, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.

92 See Valukas & Walsh, supra note 22, at 32. Under section 881(a)(6), the only limitation on the government's authority to confiscate money and other valuable assets is the
requirement that these items be the traceable proceeds of an illicit drug transaction. Id.
Subsection 881(a)(7), the real estate provision, is not triggered unless the property is used to
facilitate such a transaction. Id.
11 See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 860 (D.N.J. 1990)
(innocent owner defense to § 881(a)(6) only accessible to bona fide purchasers for value);
United States v. Parcel of Real Estate, 715 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (considering whether claimants were bona fide purchasers under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)); United States
v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (innocent owner
exception to forfeiture under § 881(a)(6) protects bona fide purchasers for value).
" See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.10, at
783 (1984). Under traditional real property law, the status of bona fide purchaser has two
elements: paying valuable consideration and acquiring property in good faith without prior
notice. See id. There are three primary types of notice which would defeat a common-law
bona fide purchaser defense: (1) actual knowledge; (2) constructive notice of facts visibly
apparent on the property itself or readily ascertainable through inquiry of those in possession of it; and (3) constructive notice of information found in public records. Id. at 786.
Because the innocent owner defense provided in section 881(a)(6) uses the term
"knowledge" without qualification, some courts have concluded that only a lack of actual
knowledge is required to assert the statutory defense. See, e.g., Parcel of Real Estate, 715 F.
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During Senate hearings conducted in 1978 concerning the inclusion
of this defense as part of subsection 881(a)(6), Senator Culver explained that its purpose was "to protect the individual who obtains
ownership of proceeds with no knowledge of the illegal transaction." 5 Senator Nunn expressed a similar understanding of the
provision when he asserted that "a bona fide party who has no
knowledge or consent to the property he owns having been derived
from an illegal transaction.., would be able to establish the fact
under this amendment and forfeiture would not occur."9' 6 It follows
that a disjunctive interpretation could never be applied to the
"without... knowledge or consent" language of this provision because knowledge of the illegal activity from which the property derived immediately disqualifies a subsequent owner from being a
bona fide purchaser.9 7 Once such knowledge has been established,
the owner cannot afterward claim lack of consent to the illegality
as a defense.9 8
By contrast, under subsection 881(a)(7), forfeitability does not
depend upon the means by which certain assets were obtained, but
rather, turns on the use made of an owner's real property.9 9 It is
Supp. at 362-63 (reasonably prudent title searcher should check for adverse interests caused
by government liens but "actual notice" is proper standard under § 881 (a)(6)).
9" 124 CONG. REC. 23,056 (daily ed. July 27, 1978) (statement of Sen. Culver) (emphasis
added).
96 Id. at 23,057 (statement of Sen. Nunn) (emphasis added).
91 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
98 See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 5, at 1275 n.99. While "lack of consent" is
specifically listed as a defense under section 881(a)(6), it has "rarely, if ever,. . . been used
successfully in this context." Id. (emphasis added). This is particularly significant since it
has been stated that "[t]he 'proceeds' portion of § 881(a)(6) generates more litigation than
any other single section." Valukas & Walsh, supra note 22, at 32.
The focus under section 881(a)(6) is not on "consent" but on "knowledge." See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 5, at 1275 n.99. There has been disagreement among the
courts as to whether knowledge must be actual or merely constructive. See, e.g., United
States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1162 (2d Cir. 1986) (subsequent transferee
of drug proceeds entitled to assert § 881(a)(6) "innocent owner" defense if transferee is
without actual or constructive knowledge of illegal activity); United States v. Four Million,
Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985) (statutory "innocent
owner" defense turns on claimant's actual not constructive knowledge), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1056 (1986).
" See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) ("which is used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate").
Unlike the section 881(a)(6) defense which operates similarly to a common-law bona
fide purchaser defense, the section 881(a)(7) "innocent owner" defense and the common-law
bona fide purchaser defense are mutually exclusive. See United States v. Premises Known
as 1908-1910, No. 5681 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In 19081910, the claimants purchased real property which was subject to forfeiture pursuant to
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conceivable, and not at all unlikely, that the owner of property
used by others in an unlawful manner could know of the illegal
activity without consenting to it. Under such circumstances, lack of
consent is highly relevant in determining whether an individual deserves the benefit of the innocent owner defense. The statements
made by Senators Nunn and Culver are inapplicable to subsection
881(a)(7) because they were referring only to the acquisition of the
tainted property by a bona fide purchaser and not to subsequent
misuse by others. 10 0 Yet, these remarks, and other materials referring to subsection 881(a)(6), have been used in support of the proposition that subsection 881(a)(7) should be given a conjunctive
interpretation.10 1
section 881(a)(7) because it had been used by the original owner to facilitate a felony narcotics violation. Id. In response to the government's motion for summary judgment in the
forfeiture action, the claimants asserted the "innocent owner" defense of section 881(a)(7).
See id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated:
"[t]o withstand summary judgment on this basis, the claimants must prove that at the time
the act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture occurred: (1) they were owners of the property in question and (2) they had no knowledge of nor gave their consent to the illegal acts
committed there." Id. (emphasis added). Pleading in the alternative, the claimants contended that they were bona fide purchasers. Id. To succeed in this defense they had to
prove that they acquired the property without knowing of the forfeiture action which had
already been instituted. Id. Thus, in order to assert the statutory "innocent owner" defense,
the claimants had to prove that they were already owners at the time of the unlawful activity, but in order to assert the common-law bona fide purchaser defense, they had to prove
that they acquired the premises after the illegal activity occurred. Id.; see also United States
v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("proceeds under
section 881(a)(6) necessarily bear the imprimatur of a priorillegal drug transaction") (emphasis in original).
100 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
101See Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d at 1445 (basing decision under section 881(a)(7) entirely on
1978 congressional joint committee report explaining section 881(a)(6)); Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d
at 663 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (legislative history of section 881(a)(6) fully supports conjunctive interpretation of section 881(a)(7)).
Perhaps one of the reasons that no court has pointed out this distinction is that Congress itself did not contemplate the fundamental differences in the two provisions when it
enacted section 881(a)(7). The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act that contained the amendment adding section 881(a)(7) was passed so quickly that one court remarked: "this Act was
passed so hastily that the use of the term 'comprehensive' in its title is more aspirational
than descriptive." Eggleston v. Colorado, 636 F. Supp. 1312, 1315 (D. Colo. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1112 (1990). Another
commentator reiterated this sentiment saying that "[tihe Crime Control Act sailed through
Congress" and calling it a "shotgun attack on serious social issues." Russell, supra note 4, at
17.
One of the weaknesses of section 881(a)(6) is that it is difficult for prosecutors to trace
the proceeds of drug transactions to the purchase of buildings. See Valukas & Walsh, supra
note 22, at 32. With this in mind, Congress enacted section 881(a)(7) in order to ease the
prosecutor's burden by providing an additional ground for the forfeiture of real property. Id.
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c.

Competing purposes of subsection 881(a) (7)

Inconsistency in the application of subsection 881(a)(7) is predictable, and to some extent inevitable, given the inherent tension
that exists between the two competing purposes of the provision
itself.102 The forfeiture of real property is meant to be a powerful
and unyielding deterrent to drug offenders while the "innocent
owner" defense is provided to temper the harsh consequences of
forfeiture law. 103 The outcome of a particular case is largely dependent upon which of these competing policies the deciding court
considers paramount. 04 These dual objectives give courts substantial leeway to engage in what can amount to results-oriented
analysis. 10
In so doing, Congress may not have considered the fact that, unlike section 881(a)(6), one
whose property is subject to forfeiture under section 881(a)(7) could conceivably know about
the illegal activity yet still be an innocent party who deserves protection. Cf. S. REP. No.
225, supra note 2, at 215 (describing § 881 (a)(7) "innocent owner" defense as being "like
that now included in those provisions permitting the civil forfeiture of certain vehicles and
moneys or securities"). It is only through actual cases arising under the real property forfeiture provision that such situations have been brought to light, and had Congress foreseen
this potential dilemma, perhaps it would have provided clearer direction for the courts so as
to avoid the confusion that has been created by this provision.
12 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 191-92. Congress intended forfeiture to be a
powerful weapon in the war on drugs. Id. at 191. Yet, Congress also expressed a desire to
protect innocent owners from the harsh effects of the provision by including an explicit
defense to forfeiture. Id. at 215. Thus, the two purposes of section 881 (a)(7) are: (1) to
authorize the civil forfeiture of real property used to commit or to facilitate a felony narcotics violation; and (2) to prevent the forfeiture of property owned by individuals who are
blameless with respect to these activities. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
103 See 124 CONG. REc. 23,056 (1978) (statement of Sen. Culver). Senator Culver acknowledged these two competing purposes when he stated that forfeiture was meant to "disrupt drug trafficking by greatly raising the risk of such trafficking," but then emphasized
that the "innocent owner" provision "specifically safeguards the rights of innocent persons."
Id.; see also Note, supra note 12, at 167 ("[a]lthough Congress was primarily concerned with
attacking the economic base of the illegal drug trade, it tempered this goal with the need to
protect innocent owners from forfeiture").
104 Compare Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d at 1445 (congressional "policy would be substantially
undercut if persons who were fully aware of the illegal connection or source of their property
were permitted to reclaim the property as 'innocent' owners") (adopting conjunctive interpretation) with 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 ("allowing a claimant to avoid forfeiture by
establishing lack of consent will [not] undermine congressional intent [since] It]he inclusion
of an express defense in the statute indicates that Congress had no desire to see innocent
owners lose their property") (adopting disjunctive approach).
105 See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures:A Framework for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 440 (1976) (discussing possibility of courts "fill[ing]
obvious gaps in a statute" by referring to legislative purpose, but really substituting their
own beliefs about what results are desirable).
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d. Judicial constructions of subsection 881(a)(7)
The most obvious explanation for the lack of uniformity in
these cases is the surprising tendency by courts to ignore prior judicial constructions of the provision. 106 While legislative intent and
the text of the statute itself are the most important tools in the
interpretive process, 10 7 case law injects an additional element of
authority that should not be ignored.' 0 8 This is especially true in
an area where few legislative materials are available for guidance
and the wording of the statute is ambiguous.'
Still, some courts
have rendered decisions without consulting any prior interpretations. 110 Others merely mention prior cases and acknowledge that
there is a conflict without attempting to conform to prior decisions."' This failure to consult prior case law has heightened the
difficulty that courts have had in developing a cohesive body of law
concerning the innocent owner defense." 2
,o6See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (example of inconsistency brought
about by refusal of some courts to follow prior judicial constructions).
107 See Kernochan, supra note 83, at 358-60. Professor Kernochan emphasized the importance of prior judicial constructions in the interpretive process:
The statutory framework of text and intent is always paramount. Each new issue
must be resolved in harmony with that framework. Precedent is to be followed
only as that framework permits. Within that framework of course, precedent is
vital. The methods of dealing with precedent are very similar to those applicable
in a common law setting, though the courts here, conscious of treading in legislative domains and hedged by fixed statutory terms, may see themselves as less free
to rework, more bound to follow, their own past precedents.
Id. at 359 (emphasis in original).
..
8 Id. at 358.
"I See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text. (discussing interpretive difficulties
stemming from ambiguity of section 881(a)(7) and lack of legislative materials to assist in
interpretive process).
"0 See, e.g., Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d at 1445 (adopting conjunctive approach without consulting prior case law).
II See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 877. The Second Circuit in 141st St. Corp. cited
cases from other circuits, and from district courts within the Second Circuit, which had
taken opposing views on the "knowledge or consent" issue. Id. However, the 141st St. Corp.
court then went on to formulate its own novel approach without following either line of
cases. Id. at 878-80; see also Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 50. In Liberty Avenue, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York acknowledged that no other
court had ever applied the "innocent owner" provision disjunctively. Id. The court then
noted the fact that earlier cases had ruled to the contrary requiring a conjunctive interpretation. Id. at 50 n.5. Instead of attempting to criticize or distinguish this persuasive authority, the court disregarded these prior decisions, stating that "[t]he court can only surmise
that the issue has never before been so starkly presented as in the instant case." Id.
" See supra notes 50-79 and accompanying text. However, not all courts have failed to
consult prior case law. It is interesting to note that Liberty Avenue, which was the first
decision to stray from the conjunctive approach, now has its own distinctive following. See
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B. The "Calero-Toledo" issue
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,1i3 the United
States Supreme Court, in now-famous dicta, acknowledged that,
although the innocence of an owner is generally not a defense to an
in rem civil forfeiture," 4 a constitutional defense may be available
if the owner is able to prove that he was not only unaware of and
uninvolved in the wrongful activity, but also that he "had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of
his property. ' In so doing, the Court formulated what has become known as the "Calero-Toledo defense." Federal courts have
divided over the significance of this dicta as it relates to cases arising under subsection 881(a)(7), and as to whether the standard articulated in Calero-Toledo should11 6be incorporated into the statutory "innocent owner" provision.

1. Judicial Confusion Over the "Calero-Toledo Defense"
Three distinct views have been expressed by the federal courts
as to the relationship of the constitutionally-based "Calero-Toledo
defense" to the statutory "innocent owner" defense provided in
GrubbRd., 886 F.2d at 626; United States v. Sixty (60) Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1419 (N.D.
Ala.), vacated on other grounds, 736 F. Supp. 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1990); United States v. 710
Main St., 744 F. Supp. 510, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
", 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
11 Id.
at 683.
11

Id. at 689. The Court, in dicta, identified two situations in which the forfeiture of an

innocent owner's property would raise "serious constitutional questions." Id. at 688-89. The

Court acknowledged that:
[I]t
would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he
was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done
all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the prescribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that the forfeiture
served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted).
116See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text. This issue has led to disagreement
and inconsistency with respect to other civil forfeiture provisions as well. Compare United
States v. One Urban Lot, 865 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1989) (Calero-Toledo inapplicable to
statutory innocent owner defense under § 881(a)(6)) and United States v. One 1985 BMW,
696 F. Supp. 336, 340 (N.D. IlM.1988) (Calero-Toledo inapplicable to § 881 (a)(4) "as a
matter of statutory construction") (dicta) with United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 888 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Calero-Toledo to civil forfeiture
pursuant to § 381(a)(4)) and United States v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp.
783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (Calero-Toledo dicta applies to § 881(a)(6) defense).
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subsection 881(a)(7).117 The first is that the dicta in Calero-Toledo

is not applicable to cases arising under subsection 881(a)(7) because, in Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court was dealing with a
statute which did not provide a defense comparable to the "innocent owner" provision contained in subsection 881(a)(7). 111 Courts
embracing this approach conclude that the constitutional defense
suggested in Calero-Toledo has no bearing on the meaning or application of the statutory defense provided in subsection
881(a)(7). 19 A second view is that the Calero-Toledo dicta is not
only relevant to subsection 881(a)(7) cases, but that the entire
"Calero-Toledo defense" ought to be merged into the statutory
"innocent owner" provision. 120 Under this approach, the dicta is
117

See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.

"' See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669. The forfeiture action involved a yacht which
was seized pursuant to a Puerto Rican statute modeled after 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988).
Id. at 665 n.1. The Puerto Rican statute contained no statutory defenses. Id. (quoting Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 24, §§ 2512(a)(4), 2512(b) (Supp.
1973)).
A number of courts have rejected the applicability of the Calero-Toledo defense to
cases involving section 881(a)(7) because the Puerto Rican statute contained no specific "innocent owner" provision. See, e.g., United States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) ("[Calero-Toledo] is inapplicable ... when the 'innocent owner' defense is being
claimed under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)"); Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 49-50 (same). This
reasoning has also been employed in connection with section 881(a)(6). See, e.g., United
States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (constitutional protection against forfeiture unnecessary under statute that provides for "innocent owner"
defense).
11 See United States v. Route 1, Box 137, 743 F. Supp. 802, 806 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (Supreme Court's requirement of proof should not control interpretation of explicit statutory
exception of § 881 (a)(7) statutory defense); United States v. Sixty (60) Acres, 727 F. Supp.
1414, 1420-21 (N.D. Ala.) (Calero-Toledo is inapplicable to § 881(a)(7) statutory defense),
vacated on other grounds, 736 F. Supp. 1579 (1990); United States v. Certain Real Property,
724 F. Supp. 908, 915-16 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (Calero-Toledo test for innocent ownership does
not apply to § 881(a)(7) forfeiture action).
120 See United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1299 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
The Calero-Toledo defense consists of three elements which the claimant must prove: (1)
lack of awareness; (2) lack of involvement; and (3) a showing that he did all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the illegal use of his property. Id. (citing Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 689-90).
Because the Calero-Toledo standard requires the claimant to prove both a lack of actual knowledge and that he took all reasonable steps necessary to prevent or discover the
illegal activity, Calero-Toledo is, in effect, a constructive knowledge standard. "Constructive
knowledge" is imputed to those facts which would have been known through the use of
reasonable care and diligence. See Tusa v. Omaha Auto Auction Inc., 712 F.2d 1248, 1254 n.
5 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250
(9th Cir. 1978) (one is deemed to have constructive knowledge of those facts discoverable
through use of due diligence); Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co. v. Mugford, 270 F. 753,
757 (9th Cir. 1921) (when facts are knowable through use of reasonable care and diligence,
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used as an additional element of "knowledge" in subsection
881(a)(7) so that in order to establish a lack thereof, the claimant
must prove not only that he had no actual knowledge of the activity but also that he did all that could reasonably be expected to
prevent the illegal use of his property.121 Finally, there is a third
view suggesting that only the portion of the "Calero-Toledo" dicta
requiring the claimant to show that he did "all that reasonably
could be expected" should be incorporated into the subsection
881(a)(7) defense. 122 Instead of using this language to supply an

additional element of "knowledge," the "reasonable precautions"
standard is used to define the term "consent. ' 12 Thus, in order to
establish a lack of consent, the owner must prove that he did all
that was reasonably necessary to prevent or terminate the unlawful
activity once he became aware of it.124

constructive knowledge of those facts imputed to person who should have discovered them).
121 See Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 663-64 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (in addition to proving
lack of knowledge and consent under § 881(a)(7), claimant must prove he did all that could
reasonably be expected to prevent illegal activity); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 715 F. Supp. 355, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (claimant must show "she did not know of the
property's connection to drug trafficking and that she took every reasonable precaution to
prevent [it]"); United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property Containing 30.80 Acres, 665 F.
Supp. 422, 425 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (statutory innocent owner defense "fully comports" with
Calero-Toledo defense), afl'd, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988).
122 See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879. The third element of the Calero-Toledo defense, requiring the claimant to prove that he did "all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property," has been called both the "reasonable standard,"
see 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. at 427, and the "'reasonable precaution' standard." See Note,
supra note 39, at 489 n.112; Note, supra note 12, at 188.
123 The Second Circuit recently became the first court to adopt this approach. See
141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879. "[To show a lack of consent must a claimant prove that he
did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal activity once he learned of
it? We conclude that he must." Id. The Second Circuit, in 141st Street Corp., went on to
explain:
the Calero-Toledo standard [is] appropriate for Section 881(a)(7) forfeiture cases
because, when combined with [the disjunctive] construction of the phrase "knowledge or consent," it provides a balance between the two congressional purposes of
making drug trafficking prohibitively expensive for the property owner and preserving the property of an innocent owner. A claimant with knowledge of the illegal use to which his property is put may defend on the basis of lack of consent,
but consent in this situation must be something more than a state of mind.
Id. Thus far, this approach has been considered by at least one other court. See United
States v. 8848 S. Commercial St., No. 89-C-3028 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (quoting 141st Street Corp. but reserving question for trial).
It appears that the application of the "reasonable precaution" standard to the "consent" element of section 881(a)(7) was first proposed in a student-written note. See Note,
supra note 39, at 486-91 (discussing proposed construction and underlying policy).
124 See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878-79. Consistent with the disjunctive approach,
the 141st Street Corp. test operates differently from the second view, which applies the
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2. The Significance of the "Calero-Toledo Defense"
The Calero-Toledo dicta identifies the minimum level of pro12 5
tection from forfeiture that is prescribed by the Constitution.
While the Constitution does not prevent Congress from enacting a
statute that provides greater protection from forfeiture, it operates
as a floor to the defense below which the courts may not venture. 2 '
The first approach, which refuses to incorporate the Calero-Toledo
standard into the subsection 881(a)(7) defense, is correct because it
recognizes that Congress was exercising its prerogative to provide a
broader level of protection to innocent owners than that afforded
by the Constitution.1 2 7 It is important to realize that Calero-To-

ledo was decided before subsection 881(a)(7) was enacted and, had
Congress desired merely to codify the Calero-Toledo defense or to
incorporate any portion of it into the statutory defense, it would
have expressly stated this intention. 2 '
Calero-Toledo dicta to the "knowledge" element, because it pertains to owners who concede
knowledge but nonetheless assert the statutory defense based on lack of consent. See supra
note 121. In the context of the 141st Street Corp. view, the "reasonable precautions" standard does not impose a constructive knowledge requirement because actual knowledge is
already established. Cf. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 (common sense dictates that "in
order to consent to drug activity, one must know of it"). Instead it places the burden on the
claimant to show that he took affirmative action to prevent or terminate the illegal activity.
See id. at 879. The court in 141st Street Corp. did not indicate exactly what actions on the
part of the owner would be sufficient to meet this high standard. See id.
121 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688-90.
For further information regarding the constitutional ramifications of civil forfeiture, see
Clark, supra note 105, at 414-89; Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some Constitutionaland Practical Considerationsof Civil Forfeitures Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHITrIER L. REV. 27 passim (1987); Note, ConstitutionalRights and Civil ForfeitureActions, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 390
passim (1988); Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Actions Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DuKE L.J. 822 passim.
126 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS1rTUTIONAL LAW 349 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Congress's ability to provide more protection of individual rights than outside limits under federal constitution established by Supreme Court).
1 See United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14, and 15, 869 F.2d 942, 947 (6th Cir. 1989) (unlike Calero-Toledo defense, statutory innocent owner defense does not require owner to
prove he has done all that could reasonably be expected to prevent proscribed use of property); Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 50 n.4 (agreeing that statutory defense contained in §
881(a)(7) is broader than Calero-Toledo defense); see also United States v. 2639
Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 992-93 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("Congress in enacting the
innocent owner defense ... may have determined to give more legal protection to claimants
than the Constitution requires").
128 This fact has been emphasized by a number of courts in rejecting the incorporation
of Calero-Toledo. See, e.g., United States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (had legislature intended to incorporate Calero-Toledo into § 881(a)(7) it would have);
United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 915 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (emphasizing that although Calero-Toledo was decided ten years before enactment of § 881(a)(7),
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With this in mind, the flaws in the other two views, both of
which incorporate the Calero-Toledo language into the "innocent
owner" provision, are readily apparent. These approaches take the
dicta out of context and use it to place an additional burden on the
owner without recognizing that the Supreme Court intended it to
be protective of owners. 129 In Calero-Toledo, the Court simply ob-

served that it might be unconstitutional to forfeit the property of
an owner who had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent the
illicit use of his property.130 It did not suggest, as some courts have
concluded, that an owner seeking to avoid a forfeiture always has
an affirmative obligation to prove that he has taken such precautions, regardless of whether Congress has provided an independent
defense within a forfeiture statute itself.13 1 Thus, these courts have
imposed an additional burden on the owner that was neither intended by the Supreme Court nor legislated by Congress.
Interestingly, there is some indication that Congress may be
3 2
moving toward adopting a "reasonable precautions" standard.
Congress still did not incorporate it into statute).
Another point stressed by the courts is that section 881(a)(4)(c), which was enacted at
the same time as section 881(a)(7), explicitly provides that the "reasonable standard" defense must be applied to cases involving the forfeiture of vessels, aircraft and vehicles. See
United States v. Route 1, Box 137, 743 F. Supp. 802, 806 (M.D. Ala. 1990); Certain Real
Property, 724 F. Supp. at 915 n.15; 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. at 427. Note that under section 881(a)(4)(c), an individual will not qualify for the "innocent owner" defense if he acted
with "willful blindness" of the illegal activity. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. at 427 n.15 (citing
United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 887 (11th Cir. 1989)); see
also Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 5, at 1278 n.113 (improper for courts to apply
Calero-Toledo defense rather than defense expressly provided in § 881(a)(7), especially in
light of amendment to § 881(a)(4)). But see Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 663-64 (Greenberg, J.,
dissenting) (Congress was aware that Calero-Toledo dicta was often used by courts in cases
involving § 881(a)(4) and showed no intent to modify this practice when § 881(a)(7)
enacted).
129 See Note, supra note 12, at 189-93 (discussing consistent misapplication by courts of
Calero-Toledo dicta).
Note also that the third view, which uses the "reasonable precautions" standard to define consent, actually changes the meaning of that standard. See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at
879. Instead of requiring the claimant to take all reasonable steps necessary to discover the
activity, as in Calero-Toledo, it requires him to do all that he can to terminate activity that
he is already aware of. See id.
130See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
121 See Note, supra note 12, at 193.
12 See 136 CONG. REC. S6595 (daily ed. May 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) (proposal for addition of "willful blindness" requirement to § 881(a)(7) innocent owner provision).
The seminal case defining "willful blindness" is United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697,
700-01 (9th Cir.) (individual said to have knowledge when he has reason to be suspicious but
deliberately avoids learning truth), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). Professors LaFave and
Scott define "willful blindness" as when a person "has his suspicion aroused but then delib-
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Given that it has not yet done so, one must conclude that the legislature is still not ready to promote deterrence by eliminating some
of the protection now available to "innocent owners" under subsection 881(a)(7)."3 ' Until such a change is made, courts should not
place additional burdens on claimants without legislative approval.
III.

SUGGESTED ANALYSIS

Clearly the most effective and definite solution to the disagreement and uncertainty that has arisen over both the interpretation of the phrase "knowledge and consent" and the applicability
of the "Calero-Toledo defense" would be a congressional clarification of the meaning of subsection 881(a) (7)."' Until such a change
is made, the federal courts must continue to struggle with the provision as it stands.
With regard to the construction of a statute, Justice Holmes
has said that "the general purpose is a more important aid to
meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay
down.' 35 With this in mind, it is clear that the disjunctive interpretation is the fairer approach to cases arising under subsection
881(a)(7) because it allows the innocent owner defense to fully
serve its protective purpose by recognizing that an owner may have
knowledge of the misuse of his real property, yet remain blameless
if he does not consent to it.' Protecting such owners does not defeat or diminish the ability of forfeiture to function as a weapon
against drug crimes since exacting punishment against those who
are innocent does not serve as a deterrent to those who are guilty.
However, one who is truly innocent, must be able to show more
than mere subjective disapproval of the illegal act if he is to qualify for a defense based on lack of consent. 137 At the same time, he
erately omits to make further inquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance." W.
LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 80, at 218 (quoting G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART

157, 159 (2d ed. 1961)).

M'See United States v. Route 1, Box 137, 743 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.14 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
"Congress apparently is considering an amendment to 881(a)(7) .... However in its current
form § 881(a)(7) does not place this burden on an owner contesting forfeiture." Id. (citations
omitted).
1 4 For a detailed proposal of legislative reform aimed at protecting innocent owners,
see Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 5, at 1297 (identifying three components that wellbalanced reform program should include).
'35 United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (citing Georgia R.R. & Banking
Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 181 (1888)).
See supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879 (lack of consent must be more than state of
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should not be subjected to the rigors of establishing that he did
"all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed
1 A line must be drawn between these two extremes defining
use."' 38
what constitutes a meaningful lack of consent.139
It is suggested that the claimant's burden should be to put
forth objective evidence corroborating his asserted lack of consent
without requiring him to prove that he did everything reasonably
possible to terminate the illegal activity taking place on his premises. One district court has concluded that the claimant should
only be required to establish that he has taken "some overt action"140 manifesting lack of consent. The first advantage of this
standard is that, while it requires the claimant to introduce objective evidence of his actions against the illegal activity, it does not
subject him to the inordinate burden of proof of the "reasonable
precautions" standard.' 4 ' The second advantage is that activity
constituting "some overt action" may prove to be more easily iden1 42
tifiable than that which constitutes all reasonable precautions.
mind); United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel, 898 F.2d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1990) (claimant's
"self-serving uncorroborated assertion" of lack of consent not enough to establish defense);
United States v. Sixty (60) Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1421 (N.D. Ala.) (mere fact that illegal
activities are contrary to spoken or unspoken wishes of passive owner not enough to constitute lack of consent), vacated on other grounds, 736 F. Supp. 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
138 See Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. at 1420 (recognizing "nice distinction between doing
everything reasonably necessary to stop the proscribed activity and doing at least something to stop it") (emphasis in original). Commentators have emphasized the difficulties of
meeting the burden of proof required under the Calero-Toledo standard. See Strafer, supra
note 5, at 847 (Calero-Toledo standard too great an obligation to satisfy due process); Note,
State & Federal Forfeiture of Property Involved in Drug Transactions, 92 DICK. L. REV.
461, 471 (1988) ("[w]hile Calero-Toledo appears to give innocent owners a defense to forfeiture... it undoubtedly leaves the owner with an insurmountable burden of proof").
'31 See Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. at 1420 (emphasizing difficulty of drawing line between consent and non-consent).
140 Id. The Sixty Acres court denied the claimant's assertion of "lack of consent" because she had taken "[n]o affirmative action whatsoever" to stop the illegal activity. Id. at
1421 (emphasis in original).
141 Id. The Sixty Acres court stated that it was "attempting to make a nice distinction
between doing everything reasonablynecessary to stop the proscribed activity and doing at
least something to stop it." Id. (emphasis in original); see also supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (recognizing need to reconcile two extremes in defining lack of consent).
142 See United States v. One Boeing 707 Aircraft, 750 F.2d 1280, 1289 (5th Cir. 1985)
(acknowledging Calero-Toledo standard is difficult, if not impossible, to define but observing that "'reasonably' is woven into the stout fabric of 'all that can be expected' "), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985).
In Sixty Acres, the court acknowledged that it was "not prepared to state and ... not
required to state" exactly what constitutes "some overt action." Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. at
1421. It would appear that the requirement of "some overt action" is easier to apply than
the Calero-Toledo standard because it does not require the court to draw a line in individ-
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The combination of the disjunctive approach and the requirement that the owner show he took "some overt action" against the
illegal activity in order to establish a lack of consent takes the
form of a three-step analysis. First, the claimant should be given
an opportunity to establish a lack of actual knowledge. 143 Then, if
knowledge is conceded or if the claimant fails to establish a lack of
knowledge, the claimant should be allowed to establish a lack of
consent to the illegal activity.1 44 Finally, the question of whether or
not a "meaningful lack of consent" has been established should be
determined based on whether the claimant has shown that he took
"some overt action" to prevent the activity once it became known
to him.14 5 If utilized by the courts, it is believed that this threestep approach would foster predictability and consistency in this
area of the law.
CONCLUSION

Until Congress or the federal judiciary formulates a more definite approach to the application of the subsection 881(a)(7) "innocent owner" defense, innocent owners will continue to be "caught
in the crossfire" not only in the on-going battle between law enforcement authorities and drug traffickers, but also in the conflict
that exists among the federal courts over the proper interpretation
of the defense. This Note has sought to identify four factors that
contribute to this conflict and explain the significance of the constitutional "Calero-Toledo defense" as it relates to the statutory
innocent owner provision. Based on these observations, this Note
has suggested an approach that would balance the various policies
behind the conflict. It is hoped that recognition of these recurring
ual cases determining what level of activity is sufficient to be considered "all that reasonably
could be expected." See, e.g., 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879 (evidence supports conclusion
that claimant did not take all reasonable steps to prevent narcotics trafficking); United
States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 428 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (facts support conclusion that
claimants did everything reasonable to prevent illegal activity on property). The "overt action" standard merely requires the court to consider a single instance of conduct to determine whether it openly demonstrates lack of consent. See, e.g., Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. at
1421 (requiring claimant to show she at least did something to deter husband's illegal
conduct).
143 See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 (claimant may establish lack of actual knowledge to qualify for § 881(a)(7) defense).
'4 See id. (under disjunctive approach, if claimant is found to have had knowledge he
may then establish lack of consent as defense); Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 627 (claimant allowed to establish lack of consent if unable to show lack of knowledge).
' See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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sources of disagreement and the approach suggested in light of
them will assist in developing a fair and workable solution to the
inconsistency and unpredictability which characterizes case law in
this area.
Alice Marie O'Brien

